Tag Archives: rigging markets

The Unrepentant Banker: How Banks Rig the Markets

Many of the big market-manipulation scandals over the past decade have much in common: huge fines for the investment banks, criminal charges for the traders and an embarrassing paper trail revealing precisely what bank employees got up to. Interest-rate traders who manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)… infamously called a chat room in which they discussed rigging exchange rates “the cartel”.

The case against JPMorgan Chase for manipulating precious-metals and Treasury markets has many of the usual features. On September 29th, 2020 it admitted to wrongdoing in relation to the actions of employees who, authorities claim, fraudulently rigged markets tens of thousands of times in 2008-16. The bank agreed to pay $920m to settle various probes by regulators and law enforcement… Some of the traders involved face criminal charges. If convicted, they are likely to spend time in jail.

The traders are alleged to have used “spoofing”, a ruse where a market-maker seeking to buy or sell an asset, like gold or a bond, places a series of phony orders on the opposite side of the market in order to confuse other market participants and move the price in his favor. A trader trying to sell gold, for instance, might place a series of buy orders, creating the illusion of demand. This dupes others into pushing prices higher, permitting the trader to sell at an elevated price. Once accomplished, the trader cancels his fake orders… According to prosecutors one JPMorgan trader described the tactic as “a little razzle-dazzle to juke the algos”. In the past two years Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Merrill Lynch and UBS have all paid penalties on spoofing charges…

Excerpt from Spoof proof: JPMorgan Chase faces a fine of $920m for market manipulation, Economist, Oct. 3, 2020

The Illusion of Transparent Markets

Investors worry that, in many cases, competition has brought down the visible price of trading by adding hidden costs. Two anxieties stand out. One is the worry that the current set-up of the markets allows high-speed traders to anticipate big orders and “front-run” them, moving prices in an unfavourable direction before an order can be executed. The other is the question of how robust the system is, with regulators still unable fully to explain events like the “flash crash” of 2010, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged by 9% in minutes before rebounding.

Start with fears of front-running. Many institutional investors complain that ultra-fast traders spot big orders entering the market, and race ahead of them to adjust their prices accordingly. Attempts to hide from the speedsters can go awry. In January Credit Suisse and Barclays, two big banks, agreed to pay $154m in fines for misleading clients about the workings of their “dark pools”, where offers to sell and bids to buy are not published. In theory, that protects investors from front-running; in practice, several of the firms running such venues had concealed the central role that high-frequency traders played on them. (Credit Suisse didn’t admit or deny wrongdoing in the settlement.)

There is another, less-often-told side to the story. Speed is necessary to knit together a dispersed set of exchanges, so that investors are immediately routed towards the best price available and so that their orders are the first to get filled. And plenty of high-frequency traders are market-makers; it is their job to adjust prices in response to new information. Nonetheless, the idea that markets are rigged is widespread, not least thanks to the publication of “Flash Boys”, a book by Michael Lewis on the evils of high-speed trading.

One proferred solution is to level the field by slowing things down deliberately. IEX, whose founder is the hero of Mr Lewis’s book, is a trading platform that has applied to the SEC to become an exchange. It uses miles of coiled cable to create a “speed bump” that delays trades to the advantage of institutional investors. The SEC has received more than 400 letters in support of its application, but there is a vigorous debate about whether IEX’s system complies with the requirements of Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS). Some think that the better solution would be to get rid of Rule 611, which in effect requires orders to be sent to the exchange showing the best price, even though such quotes can sometimes be unobtainable in practice. The SEC will vote on IEX’s application by March 21st.

Share Trading, Complicate, then Prevaricate, Economist, Feb. 27, 2016