Tag Archives: tax haven

The Essence of Capitalism: Shelters

SKU Distribution in Mesa, Arizona., is experiencing rapid growth as companies seek to access foreign-trade zones and navigate rising U.S. tariffs. Companies can use foreign-trade zones to defer tariff payments until products are sold, which operators say helps them manage supply chains and avoid bottlenecks. The foreign-trade zone program dates back to the 1930s, with roughly 260 such facilities now in the U.S. In some, inquiries from companies have recently quadrupled.

SKU Distribution had just one customer in 2024 at its Mesa, Arizona, warehouse. In 2025, it is teeming with new business from companies storing items such as aluminum poles, ice picks, carabiners and firearm safes. That is because the warehouse is the ultimate U.S.-based tariff refuge

Arizona is the foreign-trade zone capital of America, its facilities employing more workers than those of any other state, Commerce Department data shows. Apple, Intel, Honeywell Aerospace, Sub-Zero and Ball Corp. all manufacture within the Arizona facilities, together processing more than $7.5 billion in merchandise in 2023. The program has helped turn this strip of the Phoenix-area desert into a chip-making hot spot. Now, Trump’s tariffs are drawing a clientele of smaller companies looking for refuge from the trade war.

Excerpt from Owen Tucker-Smith, Inside the Arizona Warehouse That Has Become Shelter in Tariff Storm, WSJ, May 12, 2025

See also United States as a Tax Haven

Out-of-Fashion: Aggressive Tax Planning

In December 2019, Royal Dutch Shell voluntarily published its revenue, profit, taxes and other business details in each of 98 countries. The disclosure aligns with a drive by the energy company, which often attracts criticism from environmental activists, to present itself as forward-thinking, transparent and socially-minded.  That didn’t stop the information feeding a predictable host of headlines in the U.K., where the company is partly based, that it didn’t pay taxes in the country (because of losses carried forward and tax refunds). In the U.S., Shell accrued $137 million of tax—a rate of 8%.  This kind of detailed reporting is required by tax authorities in about 100 countries including the U.S. since 2017, based on rules agreed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, but it is rarely made public.

Companies that don’t jump may soon be pushed. Economy ministers from European Union countries are considering a proposal that would require all large companies with total revenue of more than €750 million ($834 million) operating in the bloc to publish the information annually. The Global Reporting Initiative, an organization that establishes sustainability standards, recently agreed to include a similar requirement. Greater transparency could also spur reform efforts and reduce incentives for complex tax arrangements. Companies, investors and states all agree that it is best to find a global solution to the problem of aggressive tax planning.

Excerpts from Rochelle Toplensky, Beginning of the End of Tax Secrecy, WSJ, Dec. 20, 2019

Micro-States as Sacrificial Lambs

On March 2015 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), part of America’s Treasury branded Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA) as a “primary money-laundering concern”, saying its top managers had moved cash for criminal groups. This so-called “311” measure (after the relevant section of the Patriot Act of 2001) is usually crippling for the bank concerned, because in effect it cuts it off from the American financial system and any banks that participate in it. BPA was no exception: the government of Andorra, a mountainous financial haven nestled between France and Spain, ended up taking over the bank despite objections from its majority shareholders, the Cierco family; its Madrid-based wealth-management arm was liquidated. The Ciercos, insisting there was no legal basis for FinCEN’s move, sued in the American courts.

On February 19, 2016, the FinCEN withdrew its designation of BPA as a money-laundering concern….FinCEN’s explanation for its reversal was that Andorra had taken steps to protect BPA from money-laundering risks, and the bank therefore no longer poses a threat. The Ciercos are having none of this. They argue that it was instead a “blatant effort to avoid judicial scrutiny” of the 311 measure. They point to the timing: the court was to hear a motion to dismiss the case next month. That would have required much more detailed evidence to be aired in support of the 311 action.

The Americans wanted to avoid this because their case was flimsy, critics say. The Ciercos have argued from the start that it was based on cases of suspected money-laundering which the bank itself had reported to Andorran regulators and had brought in KPMG, an accounting firm, to investigate.

If BPA was already cleaning up its act, why go after it at all? Some suspect the bank was a pawn in a tussle between governments: miffed that Andorra was slow to adopt American-style anti-money-laundering rules, including limits on cash transactions, America decided to show who was boss by selecting a bank to pick on. There is some evidence to support this sacrificial-lamb theory. In unscripted comments last year, for instance, an American diplomat suggested that America chose to “use the hammer” on BPA as a way of resolving wider concerns about Andorra.

The Treasury has been challenged in another 311-designation case. FBME Bank of Tanzania sued it after being accused of servicing all manner of bad guys. In the fall of 2015  an American court issued an injunction blocking the government’s action until the bank received more information about why it was deemed a threat to the financial system. The case continues. Meanwhile, FBME’s operations have been severely disrupted: it has sought an injunction to stop the authorities closing an important subsidiary in Cyprus.

These cases highlight two problems with FinCEN’s money-laundering cudgel. The first is double-standards. It tends to go after only small banks in strategically unimportant countries; its use of 311 has been likened to using a sledgehammer to crack nuts. The second is its lack of openness. It faces no requirement to make detailed evidence public, or even available to a court, at the time of action. By the time any challenge is heard, it may be too late for the bank in question.

Whoops Apocalypse, Banks and Money Laundering, Economist, Feb. 27, 2016, at 60