Tag Archives: export controls chips

Who is Afraid of China? the United States Army

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China plans to ease the flow of rare earths and other restricted materials to the U.S. by designing a system that will exclude companies with ties to the U.S. military while fast-tracking export approvals for other firms…The “validated end-user” system, or VEU, would enable Chinese leader Xi Jinping to follow through on a pledge to President Trump to facilitate the export of such materials while ensuring that they don’t end up with U.S. military suppliers, a core concern for China…  The VEU mechanism that Beijing is considering is modeled on U.S. laws and procedures, as is much of Beijing’s export-control architecture.

Under the American version of the VEU system, which has been active since 2007, certain Chinese companies are cleared to buy sensitive goods under a general authorization—essentially a simplified export-approval mechanism—instead of needing individual licenses for each purchase. This makes it easier to import controlled goods such as chemicals or chip-making equipment, but requires companies to put up with U.S. government inspections of their facilities, among other steps, to verify compliance with the program…

Companies in the U.S. and Europe have complained of reduced access to rare-earth magnets from China. Though China has periodically agreed to relax magnet restrictions, Chinese rare-earth magnet exports to the U.S. declined 29% in September 2025 from the month before

Excerpt from Jon Emont et al, China Hatches Plan to Keep U.S. Military From Getting Its Rare-Earth Magnets, WSJ, Nov. 10, 20215

Nationalizing a Crown Jewel: the case of Nexperia

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U.S. officials’ warning to their Dutch counterparts was stark: If they wanted a Netherlands-based chip maker to avoid being put on a trade blacklist, it would almost certainly have to remove its Chinese owner as CEO. “The fact that the company’s CEO is still that same Chinese owner is problematic,” American officials said in a June 2025 meeting on the topic. The Americans soon got their wish. In September 25, 2025, the Dutch economy ministry seized control of Nexperia from China’s Wingtech Technology. The next day, a Dutch court granted an emergency petition to suspend Wingtech founder Zhang Xuezheng as Nexperia’s CEO and put all but one of the semiconductor company’s shares under external management.

China quickly fired back at the seizure, ordering Wingtech in early October to suspend exports of Nexperia of chips that the company has long sent for packaging and testing in China…The Dutch economy minister said in a letter to parliament that he moved to seize control of Nexperia based on evidence that the CEO was moving quickly to shift production capacity, financial resources and intellectual property to China, not because of pressure from any other country… The Dutch government and Dutch and German executives of the company had tried for months to ringfence the company’s business from Chinese control to accommodate domestic concerns—and avoid being hit by the U.S. blacklist… Dutch officials told Nexperia that the coming expansion of U.S. trade restrictions could lead to restrictions on the business, unless measures were taken to limit the transfer of knowledge and capabilities to China.

In the past, Nexperia relied on its European factories and contract manufacturers in Taiwan to make chips for China. In 2020, Zhang set up a wafer factory in Shanghai. The business, called Wingskysemi, started production in 2023 and has become one of Nexperia’s key suppliers….

Excerpt from Sam Schechner et al, , How U.S. Pressured Netherlands to Oust CEO of Chinese-Owned Chip Maker, WSJ, Oct. 14, 2025

How China Plans to Destroy the U.S. AI Industry

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China’s restrictions on rare-earth materials announced on October 9, 2025 would mark a nearly unprecedented export control*** that stands to disrupt the global economy, giving Beijing more leverage in trade negotiations and ratcheting up pressure on the Trump administration to respond.

The rule, put out by China’s Commerce Ministry, is viewed as an escalation in the U.S.-China trade fight because it threatens the supply chain for semiconductors. Chips are the lifeblood of the economy, powering phones, computers and data centers needed to train artificial-intelligence models. The rule also would affect cars, solar panels and the equipment for making chips and other products, limiting the ability of other countries to support their own industries. China produces roughly 90% of the world’s rare-earth materials.

Global companies that sell goods with certain rare-earth materials sourced from China accounting for 0.1% or more of the product’s value would need permission from Beijing, under the new rule. Tech companies will probably find it extremely difficult to show that their chips, the equipment needed to make them and other components fall below the 0.1% threshold, industry experts said. The rules could cause a U.S. recession if implemented aggressively because of how important AI capital spending is to the economy… “It’s an economic equivalent of nuclear war—an intent to destroy the American AI industry,” said Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of the Silverado Policy Accelerator think tank.

Excerpt from Amrith Ramkumar,et al., China’s Rare-Earth Escalation Threatens Trade Talks—and the Global Economy, WSJ, Oct. 9, 2025

***The new export controls mark the first time China has applied the foreign direct product rule (FDPR)—a mechanism introduced in 1959 by the United States and long used United States to restrict semiconductor exports to China. The FDPR enables the United States to regulate the sale of foreign-made products if they incorporate U.S. technology, software, or equipment, even when produced by non-U.S. companies abroad. In effect, if U.S. technology appears anywhere in the supply chain, the United States can assert jurisdiction. See CSIS

The End of Taiwan? The End of U.S. and Europe Combined

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Prosecutors in Taiwan indicted  in August 2025 three people in a case about sensitive chip technology, alleging they stole information from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing (TSMC) to help one of TSMC’s top equipment suppliers, Tokyo Electron, win more orders…Taiwanese officials say the theft of trade secrets has grown over the past decade and point most of the blame at China. Over the past couple of years, Taiwan’s investigation bureau has probed more than 120 cases involving trade-secret theft. “If Taiwan’s technology hub falls or its technologies are lost, the impact will extend beyond Taiwan to the U.S., Europe and the rest of the world,” Sun Chen-yi, deputy director general of the investigation bureau at Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice, said in an interview before his retirement in July 2025.

Excerpt from Yang Jie et al., Three Accused of Stealing TSMC Chip Secrets to Aid Japanese Supplier, WSJ, Aug. 28, 2025

Nvidia CEO Has a Magic Needle

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Nvidia’s market share in China fell to 50% from 95% over the past four years under U.S. restrictions, Huang, Nvidia’s CEO,  said in May 2025.  He visited China at least three times in 2025 to reassure Chinese tech executives and government officials that Nvidia was committed to the market…. Huang has met with top executives of Chinese cloud-computing leader Alibaba, smartphone and automaker Xiaomi and OpenAI challenger MiniMax.People in China’s tech industry said they appreciated Huang’s efforts to modify his chips so they could be sold in China. Engineers there nicknamed him “Magic Tailor” for his skill in designing chips to thread the needle of U.S. regulations.

Knowing the importance of the Chinese market to Nvidia, Beijing increased pressure on the company: China’s cybersecurity regulator recently summoned Nvidia representatives to discuss alleged security risks of the H20 chips, citing comments by U.S. lawmakers about the need for a bill to require tracking capabilities for advanced chips sold abroad….

Excerpt from Lingling Wei et al, With Billions at Risk, Nvidia CEO Buys His Way Out of the Trade Battle, WSJ, Aug. 11, 2025

 

The Cat-and-Mouse Game: US-China, Chip Giants

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The U.S. on March 28 2025 added dozens of Chinese companies to a trade blacklist over national security concerns. American businesses seeking to sell technology to these companies will need approval from the government. Among those added were subsidiaries of Inspur Group, China’s largest server maker and a major customer for U.S. chip makers such as Nvidia, Intel and Advanced Micro Devices. Companies linked to China’s largest supercomputer maker, Sugon, were also added…

Nearly 80 companies were put on the Commerce Department’s blacklist, known as the entity list…including the U.S. server maker Aivres Systems that is wholly owned by Inspur Electronic. The latter is one-third owned by Inspur Group, according to corporate records. Aivres has been assembling high-end artificial-intelligence equipment for Nvidia. The AI-chip giant has said that Aivres will make servers using chips in the Blackwell family, Nvidia’s newest and most powerful processors.  Aivres advertises on its website that it sells servers and infrastructure powered by Blackwell chips, which are banned from sale into China…About two months after Inspur Group was added to the trade blacklist in March 2023, California-based Inspur Systems changed its name to Aivres Systems.

Excerpts from Liza Lin, Trump Takes Tough Approach to Choking Off China’s Access to U.S. Tech, WSJ, Mar. 26, 2025

The Battle to Block Access to AI

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The U.S. is imposing some of its strongest measures yet to limit Chinese advances in artificial intelligence, requiring companies to get government approval to export certain information about their AI models and set up large AI computing facilities overseas.

The rules, in January 2025, are a final push by the Biden administration in a yearslong effort to use export controls to stem China’s advances in chip-making and AI, and they have sparked a backlash from companies including Nvidia. The rules impose caps on how many advanced AI chips can be exported to certain countries and require a license to export the data that underpins the most sophisticated AI systems.

Strict sales restrictions on these chips are already in place for China, Iran and other U.S. adversaries, and the new rules carve out exemptions for a group of 18 close U.S. allies and partners. These include countries such as the U.K., France and Germany, a senior administration official said. But a broad category of more than 120 other countries, including U.S. allies in the Middle East and Asia, are set to face new hurdles in setting up huge AI computing facilities.

While the impact of the rules isn’t yet clear, they threatened to limit sales of AI chips from Nvidia, which has built a large business out of satisfying demand for AI infrastructure in countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Company officials said they expected to bring in almost $10 billion of revenue last year from so-called “sovereign AI,” where countries around the world increasingly see AI computing facilities as national assets.

Under the new rules, companies that produce AI models—the likes of OpenAI and Google—would need export licenses to send the “weights” attached to those models to many foreign countries. Model weights are the secret sauce in advanced AI systems like ChatGPT, a series of digital knobs that fine-tune their performance.

Excerpts from Asa Fitch and Liza Lin U.S. Targets China With New AI Curbs, Overriding Nvidia’s Objections, WSJ, Jan. 13, 2025

US-China Locked in Perpetual Cat and Mouse Game

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Chinese artificial-intelligence developers have found a way to use the most advanced American chips without bringing them to China. They are working with brokers to access computing power overseas, sometimes masking their identity using techniques from the cryptocurrency world. The tactic comes in response to U.S. export controls that have prevented Chinese companies from directly importing sought after AI chips developed by U.S.-based Nvidia. While it is still possible for Chinese users to physically bring Nvidia’s chips to China by tapping a network of gray-market sellers, the process is cumbersome and can’t supply all the needs of big users.

One entrepreneur helping Chinese companies overcome the hurdles is Derek Aw, a former bitcoin miner. He persuaded investors in Dubai and the U.S. to fund the purchase of AI servers housing Nvidia’s powerful H100 chips. In June 2024, Aw’s company loaded more than 300 servers with the chips into a data center in Brisbane, Australia. Three weeks later, the servers began processing AI algorithms for a company in Beijing. “There is demand. There is profit. Naturally someone will provide the supply,” Aw said.

Renting far away computing power is nothing new, and many global companies shuffle data around the world using U.S. companies’ services such as Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services. However, those companies, like banks, have “Know Your Customer” policies that may make it difficult for some Chinese customers to obtain the most advanced computing power.

The buyers and sellers of computing power and the middlemen connecting them aren’t breaking any laws, lawyers familiar with U.S. sanctions say. Washington has targeted exports of advanced chips, equipment and technology, but cloud companies say the export rules don’t restrict Chinese companies or their foreign affiliates from accessing U.S. cloud services using Nvidia chips. The Commerce Department in January 2014 proposed a rule that seeks to prevent malicious foreign entities from using U.S. cloud computing services for activities including training large AI models. U.S. cloud companies argue that the rule won’t prevent abuse and could instead undermine customer trust and weaken their competitiveness.

In platforms used by Aw and others, the billing and payment methods are designed to give the participants a high degree of anonymity. Buyers and sellers of computing power use a “smart contract” in which the terms are set in a publicly accessible digital record book. The parties to the contract are identified only by a series of letters and numbers and the buyer pays with cryptocurrency. The process extends the anonymity of cryptocurrency to the contract itself, with both using the digital record-keeping technology known as blockchain. Aw said even he might not know the real identity of the buyer. As a further mask, he and others said Chinese AI companies often make transactions through subsidiaries in Singapore or elsewhere.

The service of selling scattered computing power is called a decentralized GPU model.

Excerpts from Raffaele Huang, China’s AI Engineers Are Secretly Accessing Banned Nvidia Chips, WSJ, Aug. 26, 2024

The US-China Supercomputer Rivalry

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For decades, American and Chinese scientists collaborated on supercomputers, tennis-court-size machines essential to improving artificial intelligence, developing vaccines and predicting hurricanes. But Chinese scientists have become more secretive as the U.S. has tried to hinder China’s technological progress, and they have stopped participating altogether in a prominent international supercomputing forum.

The new secrecy also makes it harder for the U.S. government to answer a question it deems essential to national security: Does the U.S. or China have faster supercomputers? Some academics have taken it upon themselves to hunt for clues about China’s supercomputing progress, scrutinizing research papers and cornering Chinese peers at conferences.

Supercomputers have become central to the U.S.-China technological Cold War because the country with the faster supercomputers can also hold an advantage in developing nuclear weapons and other military technology. “If the other guy can use a supercomputer to simulate and develop a fighter jet or weapon 20% or even 1% better than yours in terms of range, speed and accuracy, it’s going to target you first, and then it’s checkmate,” said Jimmy Goodrich, a senior adviser for technology analysis to Rand Corp., a think tank.

The forum that China recently stopped participating in is called the Top500, which ranks the world’s 500 fastest supercomputers. While the latest ranking, released in June 2024, says the world’s three fastest computers are in the U.S., the reality is probably different. Officially, the fastest computer on the Top500 sits at the Energy Department-sponsored Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Tennessee. Called Frontier, it is about the size of two tennis courts, cost $600 million to construct and has an electricity bill of about $20 million a year, said Dongarra, who also works at Oak Ridge. It uses tens of thousands of computer chips.

Dongarra doesn’t think Frontier is actually the world’s fastest supercomputer. Scientific papers suggest that certain Chinese machines are better. One has been referred to in state media as a prototype Tianhe-3, after a Chinese term for the Milky Way galaxy, while the other is a model in the Sunway series of supercomputers.

Excerpts from Stu Woo ,US China Rift Hits Supercomputer Ties, WSJ, July 24, 2024

Great Fear and Uphill Struggle: US, Japan and China

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In Japan’s glory days of the the late 1980s, the country accounted for about half of the global semiconductor industry, and the U.S. was left to beg, plead and threaten as it tried to get a small slice of the Japanese market. A bestselling book in Japan during the Cold War’s waning days called “The Japan That Can Say No” suggested that Tokyo could leverage its dominance in semiconductors to control the world’s military balance—and perhaps help the Soviet Union instead of the U.S.

Today, the great fear driving chip investments in both U.S. and Japan is China. The U.S. policy calls for helping allies such as Japan build a supply chain that is less exposed to risks posed by a hostile Beijing. While the U.S. is expanding its own chip production through the Chips and Science Act, which includes some $53 billion of spending, people involved in the Rapidus project (between U.S. and Japan) said the U.S. needed further global diversification. ..The Rapidus project aims to get Japan back into the heart of the business of chip making by building facilities on the northern island of Hokkaido, known for its ski resorts. Rapidus says it wants to begin pilot production in 2025 and full-scale production in 2027. Some 6,000 workers are being drafted to put up the factory.

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has said that it intends to help Rapidus achieve its goals, and that it wants the Japanese semiconductor industry to have revenue of some $100 billion in 2030, triple the 2020 figure. The ministry is pitching in billions of dollars for additional projects in Japan. TSMC is building an $8.6 billion factory on the southern island of Kyushu and is in talks about a second. Assuming it gets the money, Rapidus still has to master a level of manufacturing technology attained so far by only two companies, TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics. Both are projected to have the ability to mass-produce 2-nanometer chips by 2025.

Excerpts from Peter Landers and  Yang Jie, Japan’s Plan to Become a Chipmaking Champ Hinges on This Football-Loving Engineer, WSJ, July 6, 2023

China, the U.S. and the Fentanyl Deaths

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Stopping the flow of fentanyl into the U.S. is a Biden administration priority, with the opioid scourge unleashing a wave of deaths across America. U.S. officials see China as having a critical role in that effort. Chinese companies produce chemicals, known as precursors, that are shipped to cartels in Mexico, which use them to produce fentanyl and smuggle it into the U.S…

Chinese officials have been firm with the U.S. for months that removing the police institute from the export blacklist is a precondition for restarting joint work to combat drugs, the people said. ..China maintains the U.S. is seeking to deflect blame for the crisis and that Washington hasn’t done enough to control prescription drugs, choke off domestic demand for illegal ones and raise public awareness of the issue. More than 100,000 people died of drug overdoses in the U.S. in 2022, according to a federal estimate released in May, roughly in line with 2021 levels but significantly above those just a few years earlier.

Excerpts from Brian Spegele and Charles Hutzler, U.S. Weighs Potential Deal With China on Fentanyl, WSJ, July 25, 2023

Why China Lags Behind in Artificial Intelligence

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China is two or three years behind America in building foundation models of AI. There are three reasons for this underperformance. The first concerns data. A centralized autocracy should be able to marshal lots of it—the government was, for instance, able to hand over troves of surveillance information on Chinese citizens to firms such as SenseTime or Megvii that, with the help of China’s leading computer-vision labs, then used it to develop top-notch facial-recognition systems.

That advantage has proved less formidable in the context of generative AIs, because foundation models are trained on the voluminous unstructured data of the web. American model-builders benefit from the fact that 56% of all websites are in English, whereas just 1.5% are written in Chinese, according to data from w3Techs, an internet-research site. As Yiqin Fu of Stanford University points out, the Chinese interact with the internet primarily through mobile super-apps like WeChat and Weibo. These are “walled gardens”, so much of their content is not indexed on search engines. This makes that content harder for ai models to suck up. Lack of data may explain why Wu Dao 2.0, a model unveiled in 2021 by the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, a state-backed outfit, failed to make a splash despite its possibly being computationally more complex than GPT-4.

The second reason for China’s lackluster generative achievements has to do with hardware. In 2022 America imposed export controls on technology that might give China a leg-up in AI. These cover the powerful microprocessors used in the cloud-computing data centrers where foundation models do their learning, and the chipmaking tools that could enable China to build such semiconductors on its own.

That hurt Chinese model-builders. An analysis of 26 big Chinese models by the Centre for the Governance of ai, a British think-tank, found that more than half depended on Nvidia, an American chip designer, for their processing power. Some reports suggest that SMIC, China’s biggest chipmaker, has produced prototypes just a generation or two behind TSMC, the Taiwanese industry leader that manufactures chips for Nvidia. But SMIC can probably mass-produce only chips which TSMC was churning out by the million three or four years ago.

Chinese AI firms are having trouble getting their hands on another American export: know-how. America remains a magnet for the world’s tech talent; two-thirds of ai experts in America who present papers at the main ai conference are foreign-born. Chinese engineers made up 27% of that select group in 2019. Many Chinese AI boffins studied or worked in America before bringing expertise back home. The covid-19 pandemic and rising Sino-American tensions are causing their numbers to dwindle. In the first half of 2022 America granted half as many visas to Chinese students as in the same period in 2019.

The triple shortage—of data, hardware and expertise—has been a hurdle for China. Whether it will hold Chinese ai ambitions back much longer is another matter.

Excerpts from Artificial Intelligence: Model Socialists, Economist,  May 13, 2023, at 49