Tag Archives: trade

While United States Hibernated, China Salivated

When China tightened restrictions on rare-earth exports in October 2025, stunning the United States, it was the latest reminder of Beijing’s control over an industry vital to the world economy. China’s dominance was decades in the making. Since the 1990s, China has used aggressive tactics to build up and maintain its lock over rare-earth minerals, which are essential to making magnets needed for cars, wind turbines, jet fighters and other products. Beijing provided financial support to the country’s leading companies, encouraged them to snap up rare-earth assets abroad, and passed laws preventing foreign companies from buying rare-earth mines in China. It eventually consolidated its domestic industry from hundreds of businesses into a few giant players, giving it further leverage over prices…

In 1995, Chinese state-linked companies received U.S. government approval to buy the rare-earth materials and magnet business started by General Motors, called Magnequench. In the following years, the Chinese ownership shut down all its rare-earth plants in the U.S. and shipped the equipment to China. Top American engineers were offered opportunities to go to China and set up new plants there.  “There were some colleagues that were dead set against it, saying they would never help China learn our technology,” said one magnet expert who ultimately agreed to go to China. “When I arrived, I could not believe what I was seeing. The number of new factories being built, and the rate at which they were being built, was mind-blowing,” he said….  By the mid-2000s, the U.S. rare-earth industry had been all but wiped out. Mountain Pass, America’s major rare-earth mine, had been shut down, as had virtually all American facilities that processed rare earths and turned them into magnets. China produced around 97% of the world’s rare earths, giving it what was effectively a global monopoly…

By 2021, the U.S. government was growing more worried about China’s ability to weaponize rare earths, causing prices to jump. Washington began offering large-scale funding for new rare-earth plants, including a refinery in Texas to be built by Lynas, an Australian rare-earth company. But in 2021, the Association of China Rare Earth Industry issued a warning: to China’s leadership If Beijing wanted to maintain “China’s absolute dominant position,” the country needed to relax state production quotas. Beijing responded in 2022 by pushing up output by 25%, the most in years, with another large increase the following year. Prices tanked, hitting the bottom lines of Western producers and leading some to unload assets…Beijing also introduced new measures preventing the transfer of its rare-earth processing technology abroad.

Excerpt from Jon Emont, How China Took Over the World’s Rare-Earths Industry, WSJ. Oct. 19, 2025

Loans-for-Oil: China and Latin America

China’s demand for commodities has entrenched Latin America’s position as a supplier of raw materials. The country guzzles oil from Venezuela and Ecuador, copper from Chile, soyabeans from Argentina, and iron ore from Brazil—with which it signed a corn-import deal on April 8th.   Chinese lending to the region also has a strong flavour of natural resources. Data are patchy, but according to new figures from the China-Latin America Finance Database, a joint effort between the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank, and Boston University, China committed almost $100 billion to Latin America between 2005 and 2013 (see chart). The biggest dollops by far have come from the China Development Bank (CDB). These sums are meaningful. Chinese lenders committed some $15 billion last year; the World Bank $5.2 billion in fiscal year 2013; foreign commercial banks lent an estimated $17 billion.

More than half of China’s lending to Latin America has been swallowed by Venezuela, which pays much of the loan back from the proceeds of long-term oil sales to China. Ecuador has struck similar deals, as has Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled oil firm, which negotiated a $10 billion credit line from CDB in 2009.

Such loan-for-oil arrangements suit the Chinese, and not simply because they help secure long-term energy supplies. They also reduce the risk of lending to less creditworthy countries like Venezuela and Argentina. Money from oil sales is deposited in the oil firm’s Chinese account, from where payments can be directly siphoned.  It is no surprise that Chinese money is welcome in places where financial markets are wary. Ecuador, which defaulted on its debts in 2008, has used Chinese loans both to fill in holes in its budget and to re-establish a record of repayment in advance of trying to tap bond markets again.

But Chinese credit has its attractions in other economies, too. It often makes sense for countries to diversify sources of lending. Loans can open the door to direct investment. And as Kevin Gallagher of Boston University points out, the Chinese banks operate in largely different sectors to the multilaterals. Of the money China has lent in the region since 2005, 85% has gone to infrastructure, energy and mining. Borrowers may have to spend a proportion of their loan on Chinese goods in return; some observers worry about the laxer environmental standards of Chinese banks. But the main thing is that money is available. Expect the loan figures to rise.

Chinese lending to Latin America: Flexible friends, Economist,  Apr. 12, 2014, at 27

China – Australia Dependency

China’s demand for iron and coal has helped to turn it into Australia’s biggest trading partner and to keep Australia more economically robust than most other rich countries. But in some parts of the country the new relationship with China came as a reminder of the unwelcome side-effects of the boom… Chinese trade not only helped Australia survive the global downturn. It has also boosted the currency’s strength, and made it harder for manufacturers to find markets for their exports. The problem is unevenly distributed around the country. ‘

South Australia has suffered the greatest pain: in no other state does manufacturing account for such a big share of the economy…. Five years ago, Mitsubishi closed its plant in Adelaide. Australia’s remaining carmakers, Holden, Ford and Toyota, have shed jobs steadily since then. Australians are buying imported cars more cheaply than ever, especially from Japan; their dollar has risen by 26% against the yen since October.  Even wine, South Australia’s third-biggest export, has suffered: exports in fiscal 2012 dropped in value by A$62m ($65m), or 2%. Codan, an electronics company based in Adelaide, has done better. By making many high-tech products in Malaysia, it has been able to protect itself from the strong Aussie dollar.

The Australian dollar: Resources boomerang, Economist, Apr. 20, 2013, at 44